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ABSTRACT 
The Saudi–Iranian rivalry forms one of the most important components of the 
security dynamics of the Middle East. The rivalry has intensified with each country 
toiling to undermine the other. This dynamic directly affects the prevailing fragile 
security situation of the Middle East. Although their competition appears to be an 
ideological one, geo-political motives primarily drive this rivalry. Both countries use 
religion as an instrument to influence populations across the region. Saudi Arabia and 
Iran have not directly confronted each other except to exchange hatred rhetoric. Both 
countries, however, are effectively utilizing the prevailing unrest and instability in 
adjoining countries and further complementing the instability by sponsoring proxy wars. 
Their unending quest for influence even at the cost of other countries’ turmoil has 
devastating impacts for the region. It is imperative to understand the methods both 
countries are using to enhance their influence and undermine the other in the arena 
outside their own territory. Understanding the inherent motives of the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry and their methods of execution can assist the international comity of nations to 
play a more productive role in engaging both countries for peace in the region. 
v 
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The security dynamics of the Middle East revolve around two main factors: the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the deepening rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Though the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to arise from sectarian enmity 
between Sunnis and Shi’is, geo-political, economic, and ideological factors are the driving 
force. The two states continue to struggle to become the dominant power in the Middle 
East. To enhance its own influence and undermine the other, each country is aggressively 
supporting the proxy wars in other countries of the Middle East (i.e., Iraq, Yemen, Syria, 
etc.). This intensifying rivalry has had devastating effects on the Middle East, which has 
been shattered by war for the last two decades.  
The ongoing turmoil in the Middle East since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has 
created an environment of chaos and a security vacuum spreading from Iraq to Syria to 
Yemen. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia seek to fill that vacuum with their influence and attain 
regional inspiration in the process. This power struggle between the two giants of the 
Middle East has deep implications for the peace and stability of the region. Regarding this 
turmoil and chaos Afshon Ostovar states, “As the rhetoric and proxy war escalates, neither 
side appreciates that they are destroying the region.”1 The instability in Iraq, the presence 
of Al Qaeda and ISIS in the region, and the ongoing Syrian crises have the potential to 
engulf the entire region in catastrophes. The behavior of both states has destructive 
consequences for the entire region.  
Iran and Saudi Arabia have been embroiled in a quest for enhanced regional 
influential aspirations since the Iranian Revolution, with religion being used to justify their 
activity. The Arab Spring has intensified their competition for influence in Yemen, Iraq, 
Bahrain, and Syria.2 It is now generally recognized that Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved 
                                                 
1 “Bitter Rivals: Iran and Saudi Arabia, Part 1” Frontline, 1:56:41, posted by Martin Smith, February 
20, 2018, http://www.pbs.org/video/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia-pqsnhk/. 
2 Simon Mabon, “Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: A Tangled Web of Politics and Terror,” CNN, June 
8, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/08/opinions/iran-saudi-arabia-terrorism/index.html.  
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in a “Cold War”-style struggle for dominance of the Middle East.3 In this struggle for 
enhanced regional influence, both countries are spreading their influence aggressively in 
other countries and undermining the peace and stability of the region. To understand how 
both countries are shaping the regional environment, it is imperative to comprehend the 
behavior and methods each is employing to outplay the other.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The security dynamics of the Middle East have been increasingly shaped by the 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their competition is outwardly ideological, but it 
has been driven primarily by political and economic motives. Religion has also been used 
by both states as a powerful tool to influence populations across the region. Under the 
prevailing environment, how are the two countries influencing the surrounding Muslim 
world in their pursuit of regional hegemony? This thesis will examine the methods and 
behavior that Iran and Saudi Arabia, through their competition with one another, have used 
to influence the region and to advance their political and strategic agendas.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
Saudi Arabia and Iran form the opposite poles in geo-politics of the Middle East. 
Their inter-state rivalry has affected the peace and stability of neighboring countries. 
Though multiple factors form the constituents of that rivalry, the regional political 
approach adopted by Iran’s leadership after the 1979 revolution is at the root of antagonism 
in Saudi-Iranian relations. Arab monarchies felt directly threatened when Ayatollah 
Khomeini declared that Islam was fundamentally opposed to the notion of monarchy.4 
Likewise, Saudi politics are deeply intertwined with the Wahhabi form of Islam, which 
considers Shi’is as polytheists who venerate the family of the Prophet Mohammad and are 
therefore worthy of death. Both countries use their ideologies as a driving tool to attain 
geo-political objectives for their quest for regional influence.  
                                                 
3 Emma Ashford, “The Saudi-Iranian Cold War,” The International Security Studies Forum, Policy 
Roundtable 2–4: February 20, 2018, 4, http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/2-4-saudi-iranian.  
4 Smith, “Bitter Rivals: Iran and Saudi Arabia, Part 1.”  
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The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has pitted against each other the self-proclaimed leaders 
of the two main sects in Islam: Twelver Shi’ism and Sunnism. While revolutionary Iran 
sought to export their Shi’i-centric form of theocracy beyond their borders, Saudi Arabia 
found itself, and the version of Sunnism (Wahhabism or Salafism) that its government 
champions, challenged. The Saudi royal family had proclaimed itself the custodian of 
Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, but Iran began to openly challenge the 
validity of that claim after 1979.5 Saudi Arabia views Iranian revolutionary politics as 
having a distinct objective to promote Shi’ism in a predominantly Sunni Muslim world, 
thereby posing an existential threat to the Saudi monarchy.6 
The pre-revolution era witnessed cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
especially during the reign of King Faisal (1964–1975). This could be witnessed by Iran’s 
active participation in the Mecca conferences, becoming a founding member of the league 
and help to establish the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), inaugurated by Faisal 
and the Shah in Morocco in 1969.7 During this time, the increased cooperation between the 
two states could be witnessed by trade increasing threefold. On several occasions, both 
leaders showed their willingness to cooperate and avoid confrontation. 
The Iranian Revolution started a new era of rivalry between the two states, however. 
Right from the onset, Iran’s Islamic Republic opposed the Saudi Arabian monarchy.8 
Khomeini frequently called for the overthrow of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia while 
inciting the Muslim world that the custody of the holy cities (i.e., Mecca and Medina) 
should be under the collective custodianship of the whole Muslim Ummah instead of Saudi 
monarchs. Such attacks were seen as direct threats by Saudi Arabia whose monarchs 
viewed themselves as the legitimate protectors of the holy places of Islam.9  
                                                 
5 Banafsheh Keynoush, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), 21. 
6 Keynoush, 21. 
7 Keynoush, 85. 
8 Keynoush, 109. 
9 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris 
& Co, 2013), 53. 
4 
Moreover, Iran’s ideological support to Shi’i of Eastern Saudi Arabia and in the 
surrounding countries especially Yemen, Bahrain and Iraq alarmed Saudi Arabia, which 
took such behavior as signs of Iran’s hegemonic aspirations in the region.10 Thus, the 
Iranian foreign policy objective of exporting the revolution placed Iran in conflict with 
Saudi Arabia. These conflicts have shown practical manifestations in the form of the Iran-
Iraq war (1980–1988), clashing interests in politically disturbed Iraq after the U.S. invasion 
in 2003, and Syria and Yemen after the Arab Spring (2011–present). The motive behind 
this enmity for both countries has been something more than ideology i.e., to attain 
assertive influence in the region.  
The staunch stance of both countries over naming the gulf in the region—as Iran 
calls it the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia calls it the Arabian Gulf—demonstrates their 
symbolic version of animosity with each other. The clash on the naming of the Persian/ 
Arabian Gulf is a symbolic emblem of the animosity between both countries. The gulf is 
of strategic importance to both regional states, as it is the waterway for exporting huge 
amounts of oil. The economic dependency of both countries on oil and its unhindered 
export demands secure transit through the gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.11 As a result, both 
countries show their possessiveness over the geo-strategically important location. 
Within the geo-political sphere, economics plays an important role. The economy 
of both countries depends on natural resources, with oil being the primary source of 
income.12 The countries are the two largest producers of oil. Saudi Arabia is the biggest 
shareholder in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), having one-
third of its oil reserve. With this proposition, Iran finds it hard to achieve its economic 
goals. Due to different domestic requirements (Iran having a larger population than Saudi 
Arabia), the two countries want different oil prices to fulfill their financial requirements. 
                                                 
10 Mabon, 54. 
11 Mabon, 55. 
12 Mabon, 75. 
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The Iranians want the price of oil per barrel much higher than Saudi Arabia. This difference 
puts the two countries always at conflict in the economic domain.13 
The recent easing of sanctions against Iran will help it to expand its petrochemical 
exports, thus making it competitive with Saudi Arabia in the emerging markets. As a result, 
Iran has started planning mega-projects in the petrochemical industry and is engaged with 
leading energy corporations for the upgrading of its petrochemical industry.14 All these 
developments put Saudi Arabia in an insecure position and threaten its prevailing 
hegemony in the oil industry.  
The Arab Spring—in which pro-democracy movements toppled established 
regimes—presented a number of challenges to the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as Saudi 
Arabia.15 Both Saudi Arabia and Iran viewed this movement with the stakes in managing 
the outcome of the unrest and steered it for their own benefits.16 Iran supported the protests 
in Bahrain for giving more autonomy to the majority Shi’i population but its eager support 
stumbled when the same movement sprouted in Syria.17 Afshon Ostovar remarks, “As Iran 
hailed the will of people in Bahrain, it condemned the foreign plot that was causing the 
disorder in Syria.”18 Therefore, both countries reacted to the related events of the Arab 
Spring as per their benefits. 
Both states are actively involved in engaging each other through proxy wars in 
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, etc. The ethnic composition of Iraq with the adjoining reality of 
Saudi Arabia and Iran makes it prone to be an arena of proxies for both countries. Saudi 
Arabia opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as Saudi Arabia foresaw the increased 
                                                 
13 Mabon, 75. 
14 Tamer Badawi, The Iranian-Saudi Petrochemicals Competition (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=64746.  
15 Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 204. 
16 Ostovar, 204. 
17Afshon Ostovar, Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics 
Collide (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/30/sectarian-dilemmas-in-iranian-foreign-policy-when-strategy-
and-identity-politics-collide-pub-66288. 
18 Ostovar, Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy. 
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Iranian influence in Iraq after Saddam Hussain fell, and especially after U.S. withdrawal. 
The Iranian influence within Iraq through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
and the Qods Force is irrefutable.19 Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Iraq is still not openly 
disclosed; anecdotal evidence exists, however, regarding Saudi Arabia’s financial support 
to the Sunnis of Iraq.20 Likewise, in Syria, the shrinking core of the Alawite state, coupled 
with the desperate attempt to change the regime politically, urged Sunnis to revolt.21 Iran, 
being an old ally of Syria, has been proactively supporting the Assad’s regime against the 
rebellion of the Sunni majority populace. The complex scenarios of the Middle East have 
opened up multiple arenas for both countries to fight and enhance their influence, thereby 
destroying the peace of the region.   
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is no longer a surreptitious affair and much scholarly 
work has been done on its genesis/reasons. Over a period, the relationship between both 
states has evolved into a competition with the objective of increasing regional influence. 
Under these environments, it is very important to understand the ways and methodologies 
the two countries have adapted to undermine each other with the ultimate objective of 
attaining dominant regional influence. My thesis will focus on exploring those methods 
and behaviors, which both countries are using to attain their regional influence without 
considering its devastating effects on the region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will provide a brief introduction/ identification of the rivalry 
between the two states, as well as its genesis and causes. It will establish a theoretical 
framework for describing and analyzing how the two states became rivals and influence 
the stability of the region through aggressively opposing each other’s interests. It will 
analyze the role of trans-state identities in inter-state relations. Moreover, it will examine 
                                                 
19 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 68–69. 
20 Mabon, 68. 
21 Roby C. Barrett, The Gulf and The Struggle for Hegemony, (Washington, DC: Middle East 
Institute, 2016), 6. 
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how Saudi Arabia and Iran influence the surrounding Muslim countries primarily using 
ideology as their main tool but fulfilling their geo-political motives.  
1. Identifying Rivals and Rivalries 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry can be categorized as an “interstate rivalry”: a term 
employed to capture the two actors that are engaged in a form of an intense and conflictual 
relationship.22 These types of relationships are more persistent and keep on surfacing in the 
international political world.23 Understanding the evolved behavior of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran requires identifying why states become rivals. There have been certain explanations 
by different theorists in the field of international relations, attributing various factors for 
igniting rivalry. 
As per William Thompson and David Dreyer, an interstate rivalry is an 
evolutionary process and conflicts between states are not independent but rather are part of 
a historical process in which a pair of states form and endure a relationship of unusual 
hostility. They further explain this phenomenon as, “What they do to each other is 
conditioned by what they have done to each other in the past as well as by the calculations 
about future ramifications of current choices.”24 Rivalries have a distinctive character trait 
of dealing with each other in a “psychologically charged context of path-dependent 
hostility.”25 Enduring rivalries are branded by a mutual expectation of hostility from each 
side, and this anticipatory attitude further supplements their antagonism.26 “Perception 
pathologies make the conflict worse than they might otherwise have been.”27  
William Thompson and David Dreyer observe that interstate rivalry and conflicts 
occur due to overlapping of interests and goals. The gain of one state means a loss by the 
                                                 
22 William R. Thompson and David Dreyer, Handbook of International Rivalries: 1494–2010 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 2.  
23 Thompson and Dreyer, 2. 
24 Thompson and Dreyer, 558. 
25 Thompson and Dreyer, 558. 
26 Christopher Darnton, Rivalry and Alliance in Cold War Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2014), 3. 
27 Thompson and Dreyer, Handbook of International Rivalries, 559. 
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other one.28 Christopher Darnton argues that rivalries tend to persist due to the parochial 
interests of the states rather than any mistrust between them.29 Interstate rivalry may 
encompass interests related to territory, influence, status, and ideology.30 Thompson and 
Dreyer  observe, “Bennett defines interstate rivalries are dyadic situations in which states 
disagree over the issues for  extended period of time to the extent that they engage in 
relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges.”31 
2. Incongruence Dilemma 
The incongruence dilemma encompasses the idea of identity incongruence, which 
forms the basis of tension between states, and between national and trans-state identities.32 
The incongruence dilemma explains Middle East politics, which involves the internal 
identity groups and the behavior of the states toward these groups.33 The incongruence of 
the internal identity groups shapes up their behavior toward neighboring states. In order to 
understand the incongruence dilemma, it is imperative to understand the realist and 
constructivist’s explanations of the behavior between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
Realism explains the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is due to the anarchic 
nature of the Middle East region and is directed by security concerns. John Mearsheimer 
concludes, “Great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their 
rivals with hegemony as their final goal.”34 This status does not allow for a status quo 
between the states, and states seek to maximize their share of world power. Realists argue 
that the quest of power compels states to become rivals. Realists miss important aspects of 
identity and ideologies present within a state, however.35  
                                                 
28 Thompson and Dreyer, 559. 
29 Darnton, Rivalry and Alliances in Cold War Latin America, 3. 
30 Thompson and Dreyer, Handbook of International Rivalries, 559. 
31 Thompson and Dreyer, 574. 
32 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 8. 
33 Mabon, 18. 
34 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003), 29. 
35 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 24. 
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Likewise, the constructivist rejects the notion of arm races being the dominant 
guiding factor and accords more weight to the norms of ruling elites of the Middle East, 
being the guiding factor for conflictual behavior.36 Mark L. Haas states, “The core claim is 
that there exists a strong relationship between the ideological distance dividing states’ 
leaders and their understanding of the level of threat they pose to one another’s central 
domestic and international interests. The greater the ideological differences between the 
decision-makers of two states, the greater the ideological differences dividing decision 
makers across states, the higher the perceived level of threat.”37  
The incongruence dilemma is a modified form of the security dilemma in which 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia, concerned with the potential threats posed by each other due 
to the presence of trans-state identities, act to increase their security.38 The loyalty of trans-
state identities is more inclined toward the other country and becomes a security threat. 
Simon Mabon notes, “Hinnebusch urges that with the arbitrary boundaries emerging from 
the artificial imposition of states in the Middle East, loyalty to the state is tempered by the 
loyalty to sub-state and trans-state identities in Middle East.”39 This, in turn, affects the 
relations between identity groups and state and inter-state relations. The demographic 
profiles of both countries reveal the presence of like-identity groups in both countries (i.e., 
15% Shi’i Muslims in Saudi Arabia and 10% Sunnis in Iran).40 Both Saudi Arabia and Iran 
aspire to export their religious beliefs across the gulf and Middle East regions. Societies 
with limited political space (applicable to both countries) are prone to violence and the 
presence of trans-state identities in both countries (with marginal political space) can 
always be used to ignite the conflict.41 This demographic incongruence along with limited 
political space complicates the relations between the two countries.  
                                                 
36 Mabon, 20. 
37 Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 4. 
38 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 25. 
39 Mabon, 19. 
40 Mabon, 120–131. 
41 Mabon, 108. 
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Mabon explains Joseph Nevo examining, “how the desired Saudi national identity 
falls under the jurisdiction of the House of Saud, which subscribes to a strict adherence of 
Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.”42 The House of Saud uses Wahhabism as a means of 
securing and increasing its legitimacy.43 Moreover, Wahhabi doctrine brands Shi’i 
Muslims as heretics, which in turn, drives the rulers to be antagonistic against Iran.44 The 
Iranian Revolution and its drive to inspire the other Muslim countries to follow them pose 
serious threats to the monarchs of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia sees Iran’s end objective as 
an expansive, transnational, pro-Iranian Shi’i state with expansion incorporating Lebanon, 
Syria, and Iraq, loyal to the supreme leader of Iran.45 
Fred Halliday argues, “Conflict between Arabs and Persians is a product not so 
much of imperialist interferences or of millennial or atavistic historical antagonism but of 
the two interrelated modern processes of the state formation and the rise of nationalism.”46 
The behavior of states, due to the process of state building and the necessity of deriving 
legitimacy, often result in leaders referring to myths and tales. These myths evoke 
nationalist sentiments and when coupled with Islamic rhetoric, complicate the regional 
relations.47 Both countries have used ideology as well as mythical tales to induce the 
nationalist sentiments and complicate the affairs manifold.  
Saudi Arabia and Iran, despite their ever-growing rivalry, have not directly 
confronted each other, but instead have challenged each other through proxies and rhetoric. 
Following the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf entered a 30-year period of conflict and 
instability, which continues to date.48 The Iranian Revolution was immediately followed 
by Iraq’s invasion of Iran, with Iraq’s concern over Iran’s incitement and the exporting of 
                                                 
42 Mabon, 80. 
43 Mabon, 138. 
44 Mabon, 89. 
45 Mabon, 3. 
46 Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2000), 72. 
47 Mabon, 79. 
48 Barrett, The Gulf and The Struggle for Hegemony, 95. 
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revolution amongst the Shi’i of Iraq.49 The Saudi’s involvement in the Iran-Iraq war started 
to deny Iranian expansive designs once Iran entered Iraq.50 Saudi Arabia’s support to Iraq 
during the war has deeply augmented the newly born inter-state rivalry. 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and removal of Saddam Hussein from the politics 
of Iraq forms another important event in the geo-politics of the Middle East. Iran became 
actively involved in the politically destabilized Iraq to enhance its influence in the country. 
Iran viewed this as an opportunity to increase its geo-political influence significantly in the 
region. Iran used the tool of proxy wars through client Shi’i factions in the country. To 
deny this opportunity to Iran, Saudi Arabia supported the Sunni faction in Iraq, thereby 
initiating a conundrum of struggle for gaining influence and denying it to the other. 
Likewise, the Syrian conflict though heterogeneous in nature has turned into the 
battleground for Sunnis versus Shi’i with both countries actively involved in backing 
respective sides. When the uprising began in Syria, Iran became actively involved in 
providing assistance to Assad’s regime both financially and militarily.51 This has 
compelled Saudis to support the Sunni-dominated Syrian factions in their revolt against the 
Syrian ruler. The situation is more complex than a Sunni versus Shi’i conflict as Iran sees 
this as an opportunity to establish its strong corridor of influence extending through Iraq, 
Syria, and Lebanon. This expansive design of Iran seriously undermines the Saudis’ 
influence in the Arab region, thus, giving another dimension to their rivalry. It is imperative 
to explore the methods both countries are using to fight proxy wars in Syria. How are the 
two countries embroiled in an unending conundrum of fighting against each other’s 
interests, with the motive of increasing their geo-political influence? 
3. Conclusion   
The preceding review explored the identification of rivalries with the aim of 
identifying the theoretical explanation of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 
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thesis will mainly focus on how both countries are pursuing their rivalry? How are both 
countries entangled in indirect yet active pursuance through proxy wars in neighboring 
arenas? The rivalry is being engrained in the masses of both countries especially in Iran 
where public slogans of “Down with the House of Al Saud” can be heard frequently.52 
How is this affecting the regional stability and how have the other countries become the 
theatre of their rivalry? So far, both countries are following the policy of indirect 
confrontation. My thesis will explore how they are influencing the adjoining countries 
using different methods and causing major destabilization with the objective of gaining 
geo-political influence.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The thesis will seek to explain why the two countries are such antagonists with each 
other and what factors are shaping their behavior. It will also lead to a conclusive discussion 
of how both countries are enhancing their influence and with what objective. How is it 
affecting the peace of those countries and the overall region? What consequences will it 
have for the stability and peace of the region? 
1. First Hypothesis 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is primarily driven by religious disputes and sectarian 
agendas by both states. Both the behavior and the policies of the two countries are primarily 
motivated by a desire to spread their brand of Islam beyond their borders. 
2. Second Hypothesis 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is an interstate rivalry driven primarily by conflicting 
geo-political and economic factors. While both countries use ideology as a tool to spread 
their influence, ideology is just one of many tools used to advance their larger geo-political 
and economic aims.  
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3. Third Hypothesis 
The Iran-Saudi rivalry is not driven by an incongruence dilemma. Rather, in the 
process of state formation and rise of nationalism, leaders of both countries foster the 
perception of rivalry and use it as a political tool for unifying the populace.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will identify the theoretical explanation for the rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, and will borrow the themes of different schools of thought in the field of 
international relations (IR) to explore the reasons for both countries becoming rivals. It will 
focus on identifying the methods and behaviors both countries are using for influencing 
the adjoining Muslim countries in pursuit of attaining regional influence. The purpose of 
this study is to explore how both countries are influencing the other countries in the region 
and tarnishing the regional peace. What forms the reason/ ultimate objective for their 
continuous striving and what are the implications of this rivalry for the region?  
Research for this thesis will include relevant source material including books, 
articles, journals, documentaries, and scholarly discourses about the various aspects of the 
thesis. Primary sources will include news reports from western and Middle Eastern media, 
foreign government websites, statements of the officials of both countries, religious and 
popular sources including social media, clerical lectures, and other relevant resources. 
Research will be limited to works in or translated into English and Arabic. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will be composed of four chapters. The second chapter will contain a 
deliberate study of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and their behavior through an international 
relations (IR) perspective. The third chapter will focus on three case studies: the Iran–Iraq 
War (1980–88), turmoil in Iraq after 2003, and crises in Syria (2011–present); it will also 
address both countries’ use of the existing instability as a means to increase their influence. 
How are the two countries deeply involved in supporting their clients and how has this 
complicated the overall situation? What methods are both countries employing to influence 
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their respective factions? The final chapter will conclude with a discussion of these findings 
about the ongoing rivalry between both countries and its ultimate effects on the region.   
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II. SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY THROUGH THE LENS OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is 
simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry.  
—Heinrich von Treitschke53 
 
One of the important components of the geo-politics of the Middle East is the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The rivalry between the two countries has been transformed over a 
period of time to the extent of affecting regional stability. The two countries have shown 
their capability of displaying a wide array of enmity ranging from public rhetoric to 
actively yet indirectly confronting each other. In order to understand the conflict between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is imperative to first understand why regional states become 
rivals. This chapter will attempt to posit why rivalries between states arise and persist, with 
particular focus on the Saudi-Iranian case, through the perspective of IR theory.    
As the field of IR deals with the interpretation of the behavior of states, this chapter 
will primarily focus on why states become rivals and why rivalries persist.54 The hostile 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be termed as rivalry or even bitter rivalry at 
present.55 This chapter will initially analyze the reasons for the origin of inter-state rivalries 
by evaluating them with specific relevance to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The latter part of 
the chapter will focus on IR theoretical explanations of the inter-state behavior as rivals 
and relate those behaviors to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.  
A. WHY RIVALRIES BEGIN  
How and why do the relations between states sometimes transform into rivalries? 
Political scientists have advanced many arguments that seek to explain inter-state rivalry. 
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The most common explanation focuses on entrenched geo-political and economic interests, 
where each state guards its interests while acting to prevent another state from pursuing 
their interests. The behavior of the states with each other may have deeply embedded 
historical enmity that transfers from generation to generation.56  
The behavior of the state is also governed by the anticipated actions of a hostile 
state.57 Perceived hostile acts can compel states to indulge in reciprocal hostile actions, a 
cycle, that can lead to a rivalry. Another reason for inter-state rivalry is the parochial 
interests of the actors within the state whose interests are in continuation of the rivalry.58 
In certain cases, the rivalry can have a combination of root-causes, thus, making the rivalry 
a very complex issue. While elucidating upon all theoretical motives of rivalry in the 
ensuing paragraphs, I will argue that the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is mainly driven by geo-
political factors with the ultimate objective of gaining regional hegemony with other 
factors complementing their drive. This regional hegemony is, however, more in terms of 
enhanced regional influence rather the motive of the conquest of the adversary. 
Rivalries revolve around the conflicts due to overlapping geo-political interests 
between two states. The overlapping of interests is mostly due to scarcity of resources, 
which states aim to address by enhancing their geo-political influence. In this environment, 
someone’s gain means a loss for the other.59 Thus, both the states get involved in a vicious 
cycle of achieving their geo-political goals with aggressive denial responses from the other. 
This, in turn, transforms the normal relations into enmity and further evolves to rivalry.60 
In the case of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, the geo-political factors of the Middle East 
play a vital role in shaping up the rival approach of both states toward each other. The 
Middle East has been the region subjected to myriad turbulence since the mid-20th century. 
The turbulence has lessened the role of many countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan 
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in the region while Iran and Saudi Arabia have evolved as the major players. In the 
prevailing turmoil of the region, both countries are toiling hard to achieve their geo-
political objectives (i.e., enhanced influence in the region).61 In the economic domain, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are the major oil-producing countries and have huge stakes in the 
energy sector. The interest of both countries clashes in the forum of OPEC and further 
augments the rivalry.62 Moreover, the ultimate aim of their aggressive pursuance for geo-
political and economic motives is to attain regional influence. 
The dyad theory advanced by William Thompson explains the inter-state behavior 
striving for geo-political and economic interests and that “conflicts are about real 
incompatibilities in attaining material and nonmaterial goals.”63 Moreover, as per 
Thompson, “When the dyad encompasses the states with roughly equal capabilities, the 
conflicts of interest are likely to persist because it is less likely that one part of the dyad 
will be able to impose its will on the other actor successfully.”64 The Saudi-Iranian case 
can be categorized as a dyad where both countries have roughly the same capabilities and 
can equally thwart each other. But no side has absolute dominance of the other. Therefore, 
neither side is ready to compromise and behaves in a manner that complicates the relations. 
As a result, the rivalry between the two states persists. 
Persistent historical enmity between nations can also lead to a rivalry. William 
Thompson explains interstate rivalry in this way: “Conflicts are not independent rather part 
of the historical process in which a pair of states create and sustain a relationship of atypical 
hostility for some period of time.”65 After the advent of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Arabs expanded and defeated the two great empires: the Byzantines in the West and the 
Sassanians in the East, an empire encompassing modern-day Iran, Iraq, and parts of Central 
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Asia.66 One of the possible arguments in the rivalry can be historical enmity where Persians 
view Arabs as former invaders.  
Although enmity might have existed on such bases at times in the past, there also 
have been eras where the two countries had been enjoying very friendly and cooperative 
relations especially during the time of Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran and King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia.67 Moreover, the present-day rivalry has its roots more deeply engrained in 
the events related to the 1979 Iranian Revolution as well as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). 
Therefore, the present-day rivalry seems to have much less to do with historical enmity 
than with political disputes arising from the more recent past. 
Rivalries may evolve due to hostile perception of the states toward each other. As 
Christopher Darnton states, “Rivalries are enduring, conflictual relationships between 
states. They are characterized by mutual anticipation of hostility which is reinforced as 
both sides act on these expectations, but not by constant or unrestrained violence.”68 The 
hostile anticipations of each other’s actions generate a series of unending anticipatory 
actions by both sides. It is very likely that Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the domain of the 
perception pathology, have been involved in such a pattern of behavior. Moreover, the role 
of religious clergy in promoting the hostile perception in both countries cannot be negated.  
Iran and Saudi Arabia are the primary representatives of two opposing versions of 
Islam: Shi’ism and Sunnism. Both states have a strong influence on the contemporary 
religious views and ideologies arising from their respective sects, which helps shape their 
internal politics and the regional political arena. Religious clerics form an important 
component in the policy issues of both states and generate the hostile perceptions regarding 
each other in public as well as in the rulers’ mindsets.69 Belonging to opposing sects, both 
countries perceive each other’s actions as a way to spread their ideology. This perception 
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leads to a stern and aggressive response from both sides, leaving very little room for mutual 
cooperation. Perceptions fall in the psychological domain and therefore do not have 
concrete evidential support. Although this theory cannot describe the Saudi-Iranian rivalry 
as wholesome, it cannot be totally disregarded but seen as an attributing factor. 
Another proposed explanation of persistent interstate rivalry is the parochial 
interest of domestic actors. As Darnton states, “rivalries frequently persist because of 
parochial interest within states.”70 The envisaged parochial interest of the religious clergy 
of both states is to keep the rivalry alive. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have dominant 
religious clerics with dominance in national affairs. Since there have been eras of mutual 
cooperation and trust between the two states, it relegates the role of the religious factor as 
driving force of rivalry. 
The religious factor gets indirectly involved, however, as it can be the parochial 
interest of religious clout of both states to keep the rivalry on. The religious-based public 
rhetoric of both states against each other provides the evidential support of this 
proposition.71 Recently Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti (top cleric), Abdulaziz al-Sheikh 
stated about Iranians, “We must understand these are not Muslims, they are children of 
Magi and their hostility toward Muslims is an old one, especially with the people of 
Sunna.”72 The statement of the Grand Mufti was in response to Ayatollah Ali Khameini 
urging the Muslim world to challenge the Saudi’s right to maintain the two holiest Islamic 
sites (i.e., Mecca and Medina).73  
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had always been expressing openly hate-filled 
rhetoric against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As per Banafsheh Keynoush, “from its 
inception in the spring of 1979 following a national referendum, Iran’s Islamic republic 
was the antithesis to the Saudi monarchy. Khomeini called for the overthrow of Saudi 
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monarchy, and argued that Muslims should unite as one nation (ummah) to administer the 
holy cities of Mecca and Madinah.”74 Moreover, uttering hate speech against each other’s 
ideology by the firebrand religious clerics in routine Friday prayers is a common 
phenomenon in both countries.75Although the parochial interest of religious clerics to keep 
the rivalry alive can be an attributing factor, it cannot be the single driving force behind 
this rivalry.  
B. PREVAILING SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY THROUGH REALIST AND 
CONSTRUCTIVIST’S LENS 
As per Simon Mabon, “heterogeneous theories of IR suggest that the behavior of a 
state is determined by various aspects ranging from the security concerns to state 
institutions, from identity to the construction of the international system.”76 The field of IR 
revolves around two distinct schools of thought explaining the behavior of states: realism 
and constructivism. Realism as a school of thought is predominantly focused on power.77 
I will analyze the Saudi-Iranian rivalry through different theories of IR and argue that the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry cannot be explained in whole either by realism or by constructivism. 
Although, realism explains the major portion of rivalry including the quest for power, there 
are contributory factors that can be explained only by constructivism.  
1. Realism 
Realism explains that an international system is driven by the quest for power where 
states are the unitary actors. As per Mearsheimer, the great powers are always searching 
for opportunities to achieve power over their rivals and their ultimate goal is to become the 
hegemon.78 This conundrum of power struggles makes the status quo of states to be a 
continuous struggle to achieve hegemony. As per Mearsheimer, “hegemony means 
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domination of the system.”79 Regional hegemony is the domination by the states within the 
region. The regional hegemon controls and influences the region as per its own interests. 
Moreover, the regional hegemon does not allow others to relegate its status and likewise 
does not want peers.80 
 As per Mearsheimer, the international system is anarchic in nature.81 The Middle 
East has been the epicenter of world crises, chronically war-prone and site of the world’s 
most protracted conflicts.82 The region apparently translates the realists’ anarchic region 
characterized by security competition and war. The region has been subjected to war during 
the last four decades with Saudi Arabia and Iran arising as major stakeholders in the region. 
Realists’ anarchy and the struggle for power in prevailing circumstances explain the 
behavior of both countries to enhance their influence in the region and attain regional 
hegemony (i.e., dominating influence in the region).  
Another supposition is great powers have inherently offensive military capability 
and thus are potentially dangerous to each other. Linked to the previous supposition, this 
assumption says states are never certain about other states’ intentions as to whether they 
will use their military force against each other or not. Based on these assumptions, great 
powers are compelled to behave in an anarchic manner.83 This proposition is also based on 
the realism world, where states, having the potentials to harm each other, behave as foes. 
Considering Saudi Arabia and Iran as the great powers of the Middle East, the 
behavior of both states can be translated into aforementioned assumptions. Both countries 
have relevant military capability designed to thwart each other’s territorial integrity. 
Likewise, the uncertainty about each other’s intentions, with potent military capability in 
hand, tends to engage them in a power struggle. The hostile perceptions of each other 
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further supplement the uncertainty factor, which compel both the states to engage in a 
vicious cycle of rivalry.  
As per Mearsheimer, the great powers fear and regard each other with suspicion 
and insecurities. They perceive, whether rightly or wrongly, each other as a danger and 
little room  exists for mutual trust amongst states. Mearsheimer further explains that great 
powers consider the other great power in the region as an enemy.84 Moreover, it is the 
desire to survive that inspires the states to behave aggressively. Likewise, states seek for 
their own survival and visualize other states as potential threats. Since the realists’ 
international system has no central authority to guarantee the security of any state, each 
state sees itself as vulnerable and aims for its guaranteed security. Thus, states aggressively 
guard their own interests without any compromise. This leads to the states entering into an 
unending power struggle.85  
Another explanation of states with security-threatening behavior toward each other 
has been advanced by F. Gregory Gause. He describes the phenomenon of regional security 
complex, where states feel mutually threatened by each other.86 According to this approach, 
such a regional system is characterized by mutual fear/threats from each other. He has 
termed the Persian Gulf a regional security complex. Gause further delineates that, “Such 
regional systems should include states whose primary security focus is one another, 
manifested over time in the wars they fight and time and resources they devote to dealing 
with one another. Note that this conception of a regional system does not privilege positive 
interactions such as efforts at regional integration.”87 Such a system is defined by its 
intensity and longevity of security relations. The Persian Gulf especially in the prevailing 
era has emerged as a regional security complex, wherein Iran and Saudi Arabia have 
emerged as major players. Both countries regard each other as a security threat and 
resultantly, behave in a way that has been detrimental to the regional peace.  
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Realism has further been refined into different categories, including classical 
realism, neo-realism, and neo-classical realism. According to neo-realism, the international 
system is governed by the security concerns and states again are the main factors.88 States 
are always seeking the ways and means to enhance their security. The international system 
is characterized by self-help systems where states are in the quest of enhancing their 
security.89 The neo-realism explanation revolves around the states as unitary actors. 
According to Kenneth Waltz, security is preserved through a balance of power in which 
states counter the threats with the aim of ensuring equality in the interstate relation.90 With 
regard to Saudi Arabia and Iran, the nature of rivalry is more complex; the security concern 
of both states has definitely been a major contributory factor but not the single factor 
defining their rivalry. Geo-political interests, the presence of trans-state identities, 
ideological differences and economic factors are other major actors.  
Neo-classical realism combines the classical and neo-realism with focus on the 
balance of power. Neo-classical realism as introduced by Gideon Rose, states that the scope 
of a country’s foreign policy is determined by its relative material power and still revolves 
around realists’ balance of power.91 Neo-classical realism further adds that states’ distrust 
and failure to identify each other accurately can result in an under-expansion or under-
balancing behavior leading to imbalances between the states within the international 
system.92As per Steven E. Lobell, “Neo-classical realism argues that the scope and 
ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative 
material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is 
indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through intervening 
unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure.”93 This 
explanation of neo-classical realism explains the role of strong domestic factors in Saudi 
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Arabia and Iran for their anti-behavior toward each other. Religious clergy on both sides 
and institutions like the IRGC in Iran have profound effects in shaping the Saudi-Iranian 
relations. 
Is it the ambition for geo-political interests and the quest for becoming regional 
hegemons that make Saudi Arabia and Iran rivals? Or is it the matter of survival for both 
countries that compels them to behave like rivals with each other? Is the absence of any 
central authority, possession of strong military capabilities by both states or the uncertainty 
and insecurity with each other that compels them to be rivals? Realism offers a great deal 
of explanation of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, but there are still some important and 
unexplored factors that are vital in their context. Realists primarily focus on power where 
the state acts a unitary actor. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has other important factors, 
however, including the role of ideology, trans-state identities, etc. Ideology has been a 
much-debated factor in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Both countries have religious-centric 
power hubs spreading hatred against the other’s ideology and declaring each other as 
apostates.94 Likewise, another important factor in the rivalry is the presence of trans-state 
identities in both states which leads to the incongruence dilemma.95 
The politics of the Middle East cannot be comprehended without analyzing the role 
of ideas and in particular political ideologies.96 As per Fred Halliday, “one cannot explain 
any society, political system and international relationship without societal values and 
ideologies.”97 Constructivists explain the role of norms and identities in the inter-state 
behavior more deliberately. Constructivists emphasize more on non-material factors such 
as identities/ ideologies and explain the role of norms and ideas in a more deliberate 
manner.98  
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2. Constructivism
Constructivism explains state behavior in international politics as based on cultures 
due to identities, norms, and experiences. The political scientists do not accept the powerful 
and independent impact of ideas and do not grade them as primary or independent 
variables, however. More recently, however, the importance of cultural differences 
impacting the interstate relations has gained more attention of IR theorists.99 The cultural 
differences can lead to incongruity in the interstate relations and can form an underlying 
reason for rivalry.   
Constructivists emphasize that the objective facts cannot be explained in isolation 
but are dependent on socially embedded norms. This explanation discards the material 
analysis of realists with more significance to norms and social factors.100  Another 
clarification of importance of norms in the Middle East politics comes from Michael N. 
Barnet’s work which disagrees with the realism notion of security as the main factor in 
international politics. Rather, Barnet argues that “the self-image of the leaders determines 
actions, holding that ruling elites of the Middle Eastern states are more concerned with 
perceptions, particularly the perceptions of impropriety, and thus holds symbolic politics 
over military politics.”101 Likewise, Barnet argues that, “Arab nationalism has a powerful 
hold over Arab states.”102 This strong Arab nationalist sentiment sees Iran as non-Arab and 
thus attracts enmity. This argument is associated with norms and shows how these norms 
express the identity and control the relations.  
While considering these explanations in the realm of Saudi Arabia and Iran, it 
seems to explain the relationship between the apparent concept of security-driven enmity 
and norms of the ruling elites of both states. Moreover, it is also imperative to understand 
that the states conforming to a certain identity conform to the norms associated with that 
99  Halliday, The Middle East in the International Relations, 31.
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identity. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, norms are driven by the identity of being 
Arab or Persian as well as by religious identity (i.e., Sunni versus Shi’i). Both Saudi Arabia 
and Iran represent the opposing staunch sects of Islam—Iran being the custodian of Shi’i 
Islam and Saudi Arabia representing the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the 
governing organizations of both countries have influential religious clout swaying the 
foreign policies. Combining the effect of the identities and norms has a profound impact 
on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. 
It does not imply, however, that these norms (i.e., Arab/Persian identity or 
religion/ideology) are the main driving factor of Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Both countries have 
enjoyed periods of friendly relationships especially in the reign of King Faisal and the Shah 
of Iran.103 Moreover, the rivalry is the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini’s 
rhetoric of calling the Al-Saud illegitimate custodians of Mecca and Medina.104 Therefore, 
it leads to an argument that the ruling elites of both countries are engaged in promoting 
enmity by using ideology. This enmity is for the ultimate objective of becoming the 
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Figure 1. Visual Comparison of Realism and Constructivism. 
3. Incongruence Dilemma  
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has another important factor: the 
presence of trans-state identities in both countries. Realist theories have their main focus 
on power where states act as unitary actors but misses out on the role played by identity 
groups. As per Simon Mabon, one of the powerful explanations of the Middle East politics 
is derived from what he termed the incongruence dilemma, tensions between the states and 
national identities, and between sub-and trans-state identities. 
The incongruence dilemma due to trans-state identities has pronounced effects in 
the Middle East. As Hinnebusch argues, “with arbitrary boundaries emerging from the 
artificial imposition of states in the Middle East, loyalty to state is tempered by loyalty to 
sub-state and trans-state identities.”106 This not only affects the relations between the state 
and the identity group but also antagonizes the interstate relations. As per Simon Mabon, 
“the incongruence dilemma can lead to an internal security dilemma, where identity groups 
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challenge the territorial integrity and ideological sovereignty of the regime.”107 Mabon 
states Barry Posen explaining, “security dilemmas affect the relations between identity 
groups as well as between states.”108 An internal security dilemma threatens the ruling 
elites of the state from an identity group with territorial or ideological sovereignty 
challenges.109 
The presence of 15% Shi’i Muslims in Saudi Arabia and likewise 10% Sunnis in 
Iran forms the trans-state identities creating an incongruence dilemma that contributes to 
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Both the identity groups in the respective countries have been 
socially and politically marginalized by the dominant faction. In Iran, reportedly hundreds 
of Sunnis are imprisoned. Sunnis do not enjoy religious freedom. Reportedly, there is no 
Sunni mosque in Tehran with a Sunni population of 1 million. Moreover, Sunni literature 
and teachings are banned in public schools, and new construction of Sunni mosques and 
schools is also prohibited.110 Likewise is the plight of Shi’is in Saudi Arabia. They are the 
neglected and deprived community despite belonging to the largest-oil producing region in 
Saudi Arabia. The execution of Shi’i cleric Nimr al Nimr in 2016 raised enormous rage in 
the Shi’i community, especially in Iran.111 Consequently, the presence of the incongruent 
identities in both states, transcends the inherent animosity against each other, compelling 
the IR theorists to take into consideration the trans-state identity factor, outside the realists’ 
world. 
The presence of trans-state identities in Saudi Arabia and Iran has originated the 
same kind of internal security dilemma where the ruling elites consider these identities as 
threats to their ideological and territorial sovereignty. Both states imply the presence of 
these trans-state identities in their countries as ideological as well as territorial threats. The 
oppressive behavior of the rulers of both states toward these identities explains the presence 
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of a security dilemma. This compels the identity groups to seek empathy as well as moral 
support from the other state. The response from the other state (though even confined to 
rhetoric), in turn, causes an external security dilemma and the state can be termed as facing 
an internal-external security dilemma.112  
C. CONCLUSION  
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has evolved over a period of time into a very complex 
problem. Although the enmity between the two states has historical background, this 
cannot be seen as the sole reason for their rivalry. The realist theory about the quest for 
power, with states being the unitary actors, defines most of the aspects of the rivalry 
between the two nations. After deliberating upon the behavior of the two states with each 
other in different eras, it can be deduced that both countries are toiling for geo-political and 
economic gains. Both states are aspiring for greater regional influence—a notion that can 
be elucidated through realist explanations.  
The prevailing chaos in the Middle East, especially in the regions of Iraq, Syria, 
and Yemen, with a fragile situation in Bahrain and other countries, has led to active 
involvement by both states to enhance their influence in the region. Both countries are 
desperately trying to gain their hold in the region. This quest for enhanced regional 
influence is the true narration of the realists explanation of states’ behavior. There are some 
major contributing factors that form major constituents of the behavior of both states, 
however, and which cannot be explained within the realist domain.  
The rivalry has been compounded with complexities due to multiple contributory 
factors. The hostile perceptions against each other have been a major contributory factor. 
Actions of both countries have been the result of hostile perceptions and that has involved 
them into a conundrum of antagonistic engagements. Another contributory factor in the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry is use of ideology as a driver to their main objective. Both states have 
been using ideology as the main driving tool to legitimize their enmity. Both states have 
strong religious clout influencing the states’ foreign affairs. This religious clout provides 
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the driving force to the animosity between both countries and repulses any reconciliation 
between them.  
Likewise, the presence of trans-state identities in both states keeps their rulers in an 
insecure mindset and drives them to take suppressive actions, thus drawing the hostile 
response from the other state. Thus, the presence of trans-state identities forms another 
contributory factor in the rivalry. The phenomenon of trans-state factors cannot be 
explained in the realist world as it interprets state as unitary actor. All these factors involve 
norms and identities, which can be explained by constructivists.  
To conclude, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is a complex issue, which cannot be 
explained by considering realism or constructivism in isolation. Realists’ explanations 
covers major portions of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. There are contributory factors in shaping 
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, however. The geo-political and economic motives with the 
ultimate objective to achieve regional influence, undoubtedly, constitutes a major reason 
for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and there are additional undeniable contributory factors 
adding fuel to fire. These factors can best be explained through the prism of constructivism.   
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III. CASE STUDIES: MANIFESTING SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY 
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry forms one of the main constituents of the security 
dynamics of the Middle East. In many ways, the 1979 Iranian Revolution can be seen has 
having triggered the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Since establishment of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran following the revolution, both states have actively engaged in enhancing their 
influence and undermining the other in arenas outside their borders. This chapter will 
examine the Saudi-Iranian rivalry through three case studies: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), 
the turmoil in Iraq after the U.S. invasion (2003) and the Syrian civil war (2011 to present). 
Through evaluating these cases, evidential support for how Saudi Arabia and Iran have 
been engaging each other on the turf of other countries shows how their competition is 
aiming toward enhancing their regional influence. These cases further show how Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, through their ongoing competition, have become major contributors of 
instability in the region.  
The Iranian Revolution had pronounced effects on the genesis of the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry. On the revolutionary arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 1979, Saudi 
Arabia’s King Khalid sent his congratulation uttering satisfaction on the formulation of an 
Islamic republic in Iran. As per Henner Furtig, Prince Abdullah further stated, “from now 
on Islam will be the basis of our common interests and relations.”113 Ayatollah Khomeini 
disregarded the gesture, however, and declared the monarchs of Arab countries were 
illegitimate.114 Iranian leadership added to that anti-Saudi stance by directly criticizing the 
Saudi monarchy, their oppressive policies, and questioning the legitimacy the House of Al-
Saud as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites at Mecca and Medina.115 This laid the foundation 
for the ever-increasing rivalry, and both countries since then have been actively engaged 
in contesting each other and in turn undermining the security of the region.  
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The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), relegation of Iraq in the politics of the Middle East 
after the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003–2010), and the conflicts that followed after the 
Arab Spring especially in Syria, form important events in shaping the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. 
Immediately after the revolution, Iran and Iraq got involved in a war that remains the 
Middle East’s longest interstate conflict: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).116 Saudi Arabia 
feared that victory for Iran would be a powerful supplement to its expansive ambitions of 
exporting revolution. To counter this threat, Saudi Arabia provided robust political and 
financial support to Iraq, annoying Iran and amplifying the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The U.S. 
invasion of Iraq (2003) relegated the political power of Iraq to the margins in the Middle 
East, and thus upgraded Saudi Arabia and Iran as the major powers in the region. Moreover, 
the sprouting of the Arab Spring in the region resulted in wars in several countries including 
Syria. The overall anarchy created security vacuums in Iraq and Syria, which both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have exploited to expand their influence and regional power.117 Before 
dwelling upon the case studies, I will delineate how the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) 
sowed the seeds of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the region with devastating effects toward 
the peace of the region in the times to come. 
A. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN (1979) – SOWING SEEDS OF 
RIVALRY 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran had a profound negative impact on Iran’s relations 
with the Arab world in general and with Saudi Arabia in particular. As per Vali Nasr, author 
of The Shi’i Revival, “before 1979, Islam as a political phenomenon was a marginal idea 
in the region. The Arab world was all about socialism and Arab nationalism and Iran was 
dominated by secular forces. Now once Khomeini takes over, Islam is squarely put onto 
the table in the Middle East.”118 The successful overthrow of a powerful king in Iran and 
government takeover by the revolutionaries took Ayatollah Khomeini and his anti-
monarchical Islamism to the next level. Khomeini aimed his revolutionary messages to 
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encourage the oppressed public of Arab countries to rise up against their corrupt rulers.119  
As per Henner Furtig, “More significantly, Iranian leaders and clerics directly and 
indirectly called on their brother Moslems on the other side of the Gulf to follow the 
example set by revolutionary Iran.”120 Khomeini had often called the monarchs of the Arab 
world as a tool to the United States for guarding its interests.121  
Khomeini emerged with the concept of exporting revolution by inciting the general 
masses of Arab monarchies and posed an existential threat to the rulers. Khomeini urged 
his clerics to use the gatherings of Hajj in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as a perfect 
podium to spread the theme of revolution. In 1979, Khomeini gave the following directives 
to the Iranian pilgrims:  
In this year in which Iran is the threshold of an Islamic Republic, and 
because of unjust propaganda of the foreigners, it is possible that Moslems 
from various countries not be informed of the depth of the Islamic 
movement in Iran. Therefore, it is necessary that religious leaders, speakers 
and scholars, with whatever means that are available introduce this sacred 
movement. The other pilgrims must realize that the goal of the Iranian 
Moslems is to establish an Islamic government under the banner of Islam 
and under the guidance of the Holy Quran and the Prophet of Islam so that 
our Moslem brothers will come to know that our only goal is Islam and we 
only think about the establishment of a just Islamic government.122  
As per Henner Furtig, “Iranian pilgrims were encouraged to publicize the slogans 
and demand of the Iranian Revolution during Hajj and to appeal for its imitation.”123 Saudi 
Arabia, being the host and proud supervisor of the Hajj, saw it as a direct and existential 
threat. An organized propaganda campaign by Iran complemented the efforts against the 
legitimacy of Arab monarchies. As Henner Furtig states, “An organized and expensive 
anti-Saudi propaganda campaign was carried out throughout the Arab and Islamic world. 
Daily newspapers were distributed free of charge, hundreds of books and booklets were 
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published, video tapes and cassettes were produced and distributed in the Western world, 
and pamphlets and leaflets were distributed inside the mosques, particularly on Fridays– 
all in an attempt to discredit Saudi Arabia.”124 The monthly journal of the IRGC illustrates 
an example of anti-Saudi rhetoric: 
Saudi Arabia, an Islamic country which is possessed of a centrality for 
Moslems of the world and must naturally serve as a promoter of the Islamic 
ideology, has so intermixed with the West that it can hardly be called 
independent. The entire resources of oil in Saudi Arabia are indisputably 
controlled by American trusts; and while the people there live in poverty, 
misery and ignorance, and one day’s oil income of the country can cause a 
fundamental change in their situation, the government executes the West-
dictated policies and strives to stabilize the economic situation of western 
industrialized countries which are the main exploiters of today’s world.125  
In order to attain secure political positions in the newly formed Islamic Republic of 
Iran, politicians vehemently used anti-Saudi rhetoric showing their pro-revolutionary 
sentiments.126 Then-President Abdolhassan Banisadr stated regarding the Gulf States,  
We do not consider them to be independent governments…and therefore do 
not wish to cooperate with them…; if the people in the Arab 
states…adopted the techniques developed by the Iranian revolutionaries, 
not one of these regimes would remain in existence, and they know it…All 
these overlords will be like dust in the wind.127  
This hatred rhetoric coming from the most senior officials was the initial worrisome 
event for Saudi Arabia. 
Iranians started criticizing Saudi Arabia’s legitimate right to protect Mecca and 
Medina and wanted a Joint Islamic Committee to manage the affairs of the holy places of 
Mecca and Medina.128 Initially, Saudi Arabia was not ready for this level of hostile Iranian 
onslaught. Arousing the issue of legitimacy of guarding the holy places was a limit for 
Saudi Arabia, however. The response of Saudi Arabia was in the form of a counter 
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campaign against the exporting ambitions of Islamic revolution. This was to be followed 
by an epoch in the Middle East history, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) which was to further 
nurture the seeds of Saudi-Iranian rivalry (sowed by Iranian Revolution). 
The Iran-Iraq War was the first episode of rivalry, where Saudi Arabia provided 
full support to Iraq in its ambition to oust the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. 
This started a chain of events where both countries are at daggers drawn and noticeably on 
the turf of some other country. In the ensuing paragraphs, I will take up three case studies 
to evaluate how the two countries are pursuing their objectives, undermining the others to 
attain their regional superiority, and in turn destroying the peace of the region. Case study 
1 will encompass the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), case study 2 will include the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry in the politically destabilized theater of Iraq after Saddam Hussein and case study 
3 will analyze both countries’ involvements in civil-war torn Syria after the Arab Spring.  
B. CASE STUDY 1: IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–88) 
The Iran-Iraq War is considered the longest modern interstate conventional war, 
where the two sides kept fighting for nearly eight years.129 It can be called the first backlash 
by the Arab world in response to Iran’s calls for exporting revolution in an attempt to incite 
the general masses of the Arab world. On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
invaded Iran. Iraq had conceived one of the objectives of this war was to create 
preconditions for the tumbling of the Iranian revolutionary leadership.130 The Iran-Iraq War 
and its associated events had a deep impact on Saudi-Iranian relations. Although Saudi 
Arabia did not openly support Iraq, it visualized, in this war, the accrued benefits of Iran’s 
defeat.131 The visualized objectives of the war such as the weakening of the revolutionary 
government compelled Saudi Arabia to provide covert but full support to Iraq in its attempt 
to uproot the newly established Iranian revolutionary government.  
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Saudi Arabia was visualizing this war not only as an opportunity to defeat 
revolutionary Iran but also to avoid Iranian victory resulting in a Khomeini-like 
government in Iraq since the demographic profile of Iraq supported this possibility. Victory 
for Iran meant complete domination of Iran in the region and Saudi Arabia to face the threat 
from two directions (i.e., North and East). Henner Furtig explains intricately Saudi 
Arabia’s aim about the output of the war: 
Saudi Arabia, therefore, did its utmost to prevent an overall Iranian victory, 
short of actual military participation in the war. There was not only the 
danger of a direct confrontation with Iran on the battlefield but also a 
defeated Iraq turning into Khomeini-style fundamentalism which would 
create the possibility of a war on two fronts – not necessarily a military war 
but definitely an ideological and political war.132  
The official stand of Saudi Arabia was neutral and did not openly back Iraq, mainly 
not to antagonize Iran as well as its Shi’i population in the oil-rich Eastern region of the 
country.133 “Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al Faisal described the war as ‘conflict 
between two brother Muslim countries that had to be brought speedily to termination’ and 
not a conflict in which we want to support one side against the other.”134 There is evidence 
regarding Saudi Arabia’s prior information of Saddam Hussein’s plan of invasion and tacit 
agreement of rendering support to Iraq, however. As per Henner Furtig, “there are strong 
indications that Saddam Hussein did inform Saudi Arabia of his plan of invasion, bearing 
in mind that Iraq and Saudi Arabia had signed a security cooperation agreement in February 
1979, followed by security meetings during first half of that year.”135 The initial news of 
the Saudi-Iraq alliance started surfacing after the telephone call of the Saudi King to 
Saddam Hussein. With regard to a telephone call by the Saudi ruler King Khalid ibn Abdul 
Aziz, Iraqi News Agency had been reportedly narrating the Saudi ruler’s complete 
assurance of full support to Iraq in its war with Iran, the enemy of the Arab Nation.136 Radio 
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Riyadh confined the interpretation of the call as the King’s concern about the outbreak of 
war between Iraq and Iran, however.137 As per Henner Furtig, “during the very first days 
of the war Saudi Arabia tried to avoid being labeled an official ally of Iraq, fearing Iranian 
retaliation.”138 
Saudi Arabia provided a wide array of support mainly in terms of rendering 
diplomatic, financial, logistic, and even operational support. As for Iran, Al Saud did not 
leave any area where it could provide assistance to Iraq including financial, intelligence, 
and weaponry.139 The ensuing paragraphs will elaborately survey the kind of support 
rendered by Saudi Arabia to Iraq, mainly due to its newly emerged enmity with Iran 
(destined to be transformed into an enduring rivalry).  
1. Financial Support 
Saudi Arabia had been the biggest financial supporter to Iraq during this war. The 
reason for providing huge financial support was to keep the support clandestine and not 
disclose it to Iran.140 Saudi Arabia especially exploited its dominating position in OPEC 
and created conditions favoring Iraq as well as harming Iran. As Dilip Hiro states, 
“According to Tehran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed secret agreements to raise their oil 
outputs by one million and 800,000 barrels per day respectively, and contribute the sales 
revenue to Iraq’s war effort.”141 In order to minimize Iran’s ability to earn foreign exchange 
direly needed for supporting war expenses, OPEC set the quota for Iran at 1.2 million 
barrels per day without increasing the prices.142 Saudi Arabia also raised oil production in 
the market to disrupt Iran’s oil export in the garb of “market share strategy.”143 Iran termed 
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Saudi strategy as a deliberately hostile attempt by Saudi Arabia to put pressure on the 
Iranian economy and ultimately affect the outcome of war.144 As Henner Furtig explains: 
During an OPEC ministerial meeting in December 1982, the Saudi 
delegation defeated an Iranian initiative to set production quotas determined 
by each member country’s need for foreign exchange, the size of its 
population, the capacity of its oil reserves and the quantity of its petroleum 
exports in the preceding decade. In addition, it successfully organized 
opposition to the election of an Iranian Secretary-General for OPEC during 
that meeting, although it was Iran’s turn to fill the post.145  
In addition to creating favorable conditions in OPEC, Saudi Arabia provided 
extensive monetary support to Iraq throughout the war. It rendered financial assistance to 
Iraq, amounting to US$10 billion between November 1980 and September 1981. This 
included shipment of military and civilian supplies amounting to US$ 6 billion until April 
1981 and US$ 4 billion up to December 1981.146 Iran views Saudi oil money as the main 
source of finances for Iraq during the war. Reportedly, once Iran managed to break the 
siege of Khorramshahr by pushing back Iraq with heavy casualties, Saudi Arabia provided 
US$ 20 billion in the form of aid to support Iraq in continuing the war.147 Saudi Arabia has 
also been reportedly offering the role of mediator and even offered to pay for Iraq during 
its weapons deal with France worth 10 billion French francs.148  
Saudi’s version of its support to Iraq became more public after Iraq invaded Kuwait 
in 1991. As per Reuters on January 15, 1991, King Fahd stated, “the total value of the 
funding, interest free loans, and other support on the form of oil cargo and facilities were 
over US$ 27.2 billion.”149 Evidence claims Saudi Arabia was completely financing this 
war. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia himself confessed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by 
saying, “the action of the leader of Iraq (in invading Kuwait) showed his ingratitude to the 
Saudi military supports for him during eight years of war against Iran. If Iraq says it 
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sacrificed its forces, we say we sacrificed our money, our modern weapons, and our 
international cooperation during the war.”150 Saudi Arabia was solely managing the 
finances of the war ranging from procurement of military equipment to the pay of normal 
soldier. One of the Saudi defense ministers stated, “Iraq now aims to invade Saudi Arabia, 
and perhaps it forgot in that war time we even provided its soldiers’ beverages.”151  
2. Logistical Support 
Apart from providing direct financial support, Saudi Arabia provided 
comprehensive logistic support to Iraq. Iran, owing to its complete domination of the 
Persian Gulf, posed serious repercussions to Iraq for smooth export of its oil. The strong 
Iranian naval forces (as compared to Iraq) further complimented the Iranian strength by 
posing a strong naval blockade.152 To counteract this, Saudi Arabia provided all of its Red 
Sea ports, for transportation of civilian and military imports for Iraq. The port of Qadimah, 
North of Jeddah, became the main terminal of all the supply routes for Iraq.153 Likewise, 
when Syria, Iran’s ally in the war, closed the Iraqi oil pipeline running from Iraq to the port 
of Baniyas in Syria, it was Saudi Arabia who came to rescue Iraq and continue its oil export 
through its newly constructed pipeline from Rumailah (Iraq) to Yanbu (Saudi Arabia).154 
3. Operational Support 
Apart from comprehensive financial and deliberate logistic support, Saudi Arabia 
also provided operational support to Iraq during the war. Saudi Arabia allowed its air space 
to be used by Iraqi warplanes and allowed Iraqi aircraft to be placed on Saudi soil, thereby 
not only lessening their exposure to the Iranian air force but also providing the Iraqi air 
force the opportunity to carry out attacks from multiple directions .155 Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia provided elaborate intelligence support to Iraq during the entire course of the war. 
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Iran alleged that Saudi Arabia used its latest Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) flying radars for gathering and dissemination of strategic intelligence 
information to Iraq with the consent of United States.156 Saudi Arabia also provided high-
resolution satellite imagery of Iranian forces’ deployments to Iraqi forces thus giving a 
cutting edge to Iraq over Iran. Likewise, Bandar bin Sultan (then ambassador of Saudi 
Arabia to the U.S) mentioned Saudi Arabia acting as mediator and providing important 
intelligence information collected by the U.S. to Iraq.157 
The preceding paragraphs provided evidential support where Saudi Arabia 
provided an all-out support to Iraq with the primary aim of defeating Iran. Saudi Arabia 
visualized Iran’s victory as a catalyst in spreading the Islamic revolution in Iraq. Iranian 
victory would also undermine the regional stature of Saudi Arabia. Likewise, they viewed 
Iranian defeat as a means to not only shun the ideology of spreading revolution but also 
weaken its root in Iran, a condition favoring their monarchies. The indecisive culmination 
of the war, however, did not yield the desired results for either state. Later on, events like 
the ousting of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the sprouting of the Arab Spring, and related 
subsequent chaos in the region, once again provided the environments where the two 
countries were pitched against each other but in arenas other than their homelands. The 
next case studies will analyze the Iraqi and Syrian crises where both Saudi Arabia and Iran 
found an opportunity to spread their influence due to local instability and unrest. 
C. CASE STUDY 2: IRAQ—THE THEATRE OF SAUDI-IRANIAN 
RIVALRY  
Iraq has been the victim of terror, where the politically motivated groups are 
perpetrating violence and often noncombatant civilians are becoming the victims. The 
political mess in the country has resulted in an extremely high number of casualties. After 
the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq came into the attention of Saudi Arabia and Iran to establish 
their influence. Later on, the instability in Iraq was further compounded by inclusion of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the game of thrones. To understand the situation 
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in totality, the geo-politics of Iraq from the 2003 U.S. invasion until now can be divided 
into two distinct time-periods. The initial period is the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003–10) 
and the second is the rise of ISIS especially in 2014. The initial time-period has witnessed 
more Saudi-Iranian competition for gaining influence in Iraq, which I will elaborate upon 
in the ensuing paragraph. During the time period of ISIS’s emerging influence, it was 
mainly Iran that provided active support to arm proxies against ISIS, which I will explain 
in the later part of the Iranian role. 
The time of U.S. occupation, witnessed systematic increase in Iranian influence, 
which Saudi Arabia proactively countered. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a 
political vacuum in the country, which Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited to pursue their geo-
political objectives, spreading their influence by supporting proxy wars and thus destroying 
the peace of the country. The ensuing paragraphs will discuss how Iraq became the arena 
for Saudi Arabia and Iran to fight against each other and how the two countries support 
their sponsored groups to enhance their influence and deny it to the other. 
The overthrow of the Iraqi government in 2003 transformed the country from 
somewhat stable into a weakly institutionalized state, susceptible to enhanced regional 
influence. The demographic profile of the country helped the Shi’i faction to come to 
power, which had remained suppressed during Ba’athist rule. Saudi Arabia, which was not 
in favor of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, saw the Shi’i rulers in Iraq as a threat to its influence. 
Iran could not have visualized a better situation in Iraq and started increasing its influence 
in the country.158 With a demographic profile supporting Iran, it was all set to increase its 
influence in Iraq. 
1. Iranian Role  
Iran fully exploited the events following the U.S. invasion of Iraq and toppling of 
Saddam Hussein as an opportunity for enhancing its influence in Iraq. With the drive of 
exporting Islamic revolution, Iran has enduring interests in Iraq especially about the role 
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of Iraqi Shi’i in politics.159 Iraq with its supporting demographic profile and without 
Saddam Hussein was an ideal turf for Iran to enhance its influence. Iranian interests in Iraq 
are driven by multiple factors including religion, ideology, security, and economy.160 Iran 
started with systematic increase in its influence in Iraq. As per Alireza Nader et al., “Iran 
has pursued three distinct avenues of influence in Iraqi politics: 
 Promoting, its religious influence and propagating velayat-e-faghih. 
 Positioning itself as the main arbitrator of Iraqi political disputes. Iran 
helps its various allies gain power through Iraq’s political process, then, 
act to balance them against one another, eventually serving as the power 
broker to resolve the very disputes that it often played a role in causing. 
 Calibrating violent activity among loyal Shi’i militias as means of 
pressuring political actors.”161 
Thereon, Iranians started exploiting their established networks and actively yet 
covertly rendered support to these networks. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s 
government, Iranian leaders nurtured lasting bonds with all significant Iraqi opposition 
groups. Due to their long adversarial relationship with Saddam Hussein, the Shi’i and 
Kurdish opposition were in ideal position to take advantage of the power vacuum and 
became Iranian clientele in Iraq. Iranian very articulately designed its covert support to the 
like-minded factions of the Iraqi populace, thereby enhancing its role not only in Iraq but 
regionally. 
During the initial periods, Iran increased its extensive intelligence and covert action 
network but in a dormant role. Then there was a policy change from Iran’s dormant role 
owing to its initial cautious approach to avoid U.S. direct reaction to a more aggressive role 
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to enhance influence in Iraq. Iran was now viewing Iraq not as an enemy but as a weaker 
state with no potentials to harm Iran. In 2005 and 2006, Iran actively started promoting 
various Iraqi armed groups especially Shi’i groups believing that Iraqi Shi’i are more likely 
to prevail and well-disposed to Iran.162 This active support was in the form of funding, 
training and providing weapons to the like-minded factions in Iraq with the view to enhance 
its influence in Iraq.163 Owing to favorable demographic profile of the country, Iran saw 
the Iraqi power vacuum as an opportunity for enhancing its influence in a war-trodden 
country.  
Iranian support to these groups was in terms of training, weapons, information, and 
finances. Iran supported the Shi’i factions, especially the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI)/SCIRI/Badr, and the support became more militarized. After the U.S. invasion, 
SCIRI became more cohesive in the newly formed Iraqi government. Likewise, Iranian 
relations with other militias like Fadhila and Jayesh al Mahdi (JAM) also flourished thus 
causing unrest and turmoil.164 It is also believed that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are 
helping mobilize Iraqi Shi’i volunteers to fight insurgents. There have been number of 
splinter groups from JAM. One of them is Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) which is a militant 
organization, considered to be extremely loyal to Iran and providing varied ranges of social 
services as a means to promote pro-Iranian ideology.165 Kata’ib Hezbollah is another 
splinter group and is the formulation of Qods Force. Alireza Nader surveys as, “Along with 
AAH, the U.S. considers Kata’ib Hezbollah a direct-action arm of the IRGC. This secretive 
group has around 3,000 fighters who are highly loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei.”166 Iranians 
have been coordinating military activity on behalf of the Iraqi government, liaising with 
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various Shi’i factions in Iraq.167 This shows Iran’s deep involvement in Iraqi politics by 
using all means including militancy to increase its influence in the region. This in turn is 
destroying the peace of Iraq and innocent civilians are becoming the victim of this brutal 
politics. 
Iran played an influential role in shaping the new politics of Iraq. In January 2005, 
Shi’i-dominated government was elected and formed a new constitution favorable to 
Iran.168  As per Alireza Nader, “Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani often acts as a 
political arbitrator between Iraqi Shi’i parties. He heads all of Iran’s activities in Iraq, 
including overseeing Shi’i militias, disbursing funds to political leaders, and overseeing 
soft power activities.”169 Reportedly, Qassem Soleimani had been playing a key role in all 
important Iraqi government discussions. This shows how intricately and deliberately, the 
Iranians increased their influence in Iraq and the region. 
The rise of ISIS and its gaining a strong foothold in Iraq forms another important 
benchmark in the geo-politics of Iraq. ISIS’s substantial advance in Iraq especially after 
2014, threatened Iranian influence in Iraq. Iran had been blaming the creation of ISIS on 
foreign occupation.170 Iran started its fight with ISIS with the objective of destroying it 
while maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq. With the preeminence of ISIS’s influence 
in Iraq, Iran activated its client militant groups to fight. In its fight with ISIS, Iran again 
opted to ignite proxies through all stakeholders, which includes Shi’i and Kurds. As per 
Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran was the first country to provide [the Kurds] 
with weapons and ammunition. Among the groups that the West and Iran are empowering, 
the peshmerga, the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) and the PKK Syrian affiliate, the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) stands out.”171 Iranian support to Iraqi government and 
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various militia groups against ISIS, helped in the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and allowed Iran to 
retain its influence in the country. 
2. Saudi Arabian Involvement  
The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime was a major shift in the regional balance 
of power toward Iran, thus increasing Saudis’ perceptions of the threat. Saudi Arabia, right 
from the outset did not support the U.S. invasion of Iraq and had anticipated the increased 
Iranian influence in Iraq. The current dominant Iranian role in the politics of Iraq has 
undermined Saudi Arabia’s influence in Iraq. In order to restore the balance, Saudi Arabia 
is providing all-out support to the Sunni factions against Shi’i groups with the obvious 
increase in the unrest in the region.172 
From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, though Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had also been 
posing security threats to the kingdom, at least it had also been a balancing force against 
Tehran’s influence in the region.173 This balance collapsed after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The increased Iranian influence in Iraq compelled Saudi Arabia 
to render support to the Sunni factions in Iraq. Many Saudi citizens have been reportedly, 
giving millions of dollars to Sunni insurgents in Iraq.174 As per the Iraqi government, this 
money is being primarily used for purchasing of weapons, which include shoulder-fired 
anti-aircraft missiles.175 High-ranking Iraqi officials have reported that most of the Saudi 
money comes from the donations, called Zakat, collected for Islamic causes and charity. 
Some of the money is reportedly given to Iraq’s insurgents and some is reported to be given 
to clerics who channel it to the insurgents.176  
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There have been reports of unofficial support rendered especially by the Saudi 
youth who were religiously motivated to fight Jihad in Iraq. They were called “The Saudis 
of Iraq.”177 As per Zaki Chehab, “Counterterrorist experts in Saudi Arabia have calculated 
that the number of young Saudis who participated in Iraq’s jihad between 2003 and 2004 
exceeded twenty five hundred fighters. Five hundred of these were killed, and Iraqi 
government arrested mostly the rest of them.178 The Saudi government did not support 
these factions, however, due to the fear that “The Saudis of Iraq” might be a security risk 
for the Saudi government in the future.179 
With the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and its animosity toward the Shi’i faction, Iran 
occasionally blamed Saudi Arabia for rendering support to ISIS. A senior Iranian advisor, 
Hossein Sheikholeslam stated, “As long as Saudi Arabia insists on its support for violence 
like what it is doing in Iraq through ISIS, we cannot see any improvement in relations.”180 
Once a senior Qatari official reportedly stated, “ISIS is a Saudi Project.”181 Saudi Arabia 
has denied these allegations, however, while blaming the Iraqi government for its sectarian 
policies and closeness to Iraq.  
This conflictual position of both countries and their policy of aggressively 
following their agendas has been a major cause of unrest in Iraq. As a result, Iraq has been 
the key victim of unrest, bringing devastating havocs throughout the country. The quest for 
influence in the region (by both countries) has provoked a long and vicious circle of proxy 
war in Iraq. Both Sunni and Shi’i militias are involved, resulting in devastating destruction 
of the region. The number of killings is enormous and the devastation inflicted is massive. 
In 2016, around 9,764 people were killed in Iraq.182 Iraq suffered not only in terms of 
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number of killings but also by the greatest number of attacks in 2016. Although not all the 
killings or incidents can be attributed to Saudi Arabia and Iran, their sponsored proxies 
share the major contributory portion of it. The unending surge of violence in Iraq has 
destroyed the country’s infrastructure colossally, and destroyed the peace of the country 
with spillover effects in adjoining Syria.  
D. CASE STUDY 3: SYRIA—THE ARENA OF SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY 
The Arab Spring was a series of revolutionary waves of both violent and non-
violent protests in North Africa and the Middle East, beginning on 18 December 2010 in 
Tunisia.183 The effects of these quickly spread in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. 
In most of the countries, the wave of revolutions and protests faded by mid-2012 due to 
violent responses from authorities, pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. In 
Syria, however, the situation got worse and more complicated. The militarized struggle of 
multiple armed groups against ruling Alawites, brutal response by the government and 
involvement of a number of players has caused great havoc in the entire country, destroyed 
the urban areas, and resulted into innumerable deaths as well as displacement of innocent 
civilians. Syria has now been transformed into a complex arena of militancy, involving 
regional as well as super powers. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are once again pitched against 
each other to enhance their influence in Syria. Iran and Saudi Arabia are aggressively 
supporting their respective factions in their geo-political pursuits, and becoming the major 
cause of civil war with civilians becoming the victim. 
The Syrian crisis started after the eruption of pro-democracy demonstrations in 
March 2011, in the southern city of Deraa due to the arrest and torture of some youngsters 
alleged to have painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall.184 The security forces 
opened fire and killed some demonstrators. This triggered nationwide unrest and protests, 
demanding the resignation of Bashar ul Assad. The government’s use of force to suppress 
the protests resulted in a more resilient response from the public and by July 2011, 
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thousands of people were out in the streets protesting against government throughout the 
country. The protests started converting into armed struggles when the opposition 
supporters began to take up arms against security forces.185 Initially, protests against the 
regime had ethnic and sectarian reasons but later on, they transformed into a rebel 
movement dominated by the Sunni Arabs. The regime’s tactics of handling the issue 
sparked sectarian polarization.186 
The conflict has evolved and attained a sectarian connotation, pitting the country’s 
majority Sunnis against the regime’s Shi’i Alawites. Due to the violent reaction from the 
government to suppress the protests, the hatred toward Alawites that controlled the central 
power increased. The regime employed largely Alawite gangs known as Shabiha (ghosts) 
to retaliate against Sunnis, who began charging through Sunni communities, brutally 
killing and torturing men, women and children.187 The conflict has drawn regional and 
world powers into the arena and the rise of ISIS in the country has added further 
complications in the overall scenario. 
Syria is a very important ally for Iran and the only Arab country that supported Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88). Moreover, both states draw coherence and cooperation 
from representing the same Shi’i sect of the religion (although there exist differences 
between them, Syrians being Alawite and Iranians being Twelver Shi’i). More importantly, 
Syria is important to Iran for its fundamental interests in the Western Mediterranean (i.e., 
support of Hezbollah, Hamas) for which Syria serves as an important base.188 
1. Iranian Involvement in the Syrian Crisis 
For a layman, the strength of the Iran-Syria nexus appears to be driven by the 
commonality of being Shi’i-ruled states. Alawites are considered an off-shoot of Shi’i 
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Islam, and most Shi’i (Twelver Shi’i) consider Alawites as heretics.189 David W. Lesch, 
however, notes that “this alliance—Syria’s most important of the last decade—is strategic, 
and the best explanation for it lies in the old Arab proverb ‘the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.’ That ‘enemy’ was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”190 This alliance gained significant 
strength during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), where Syria supported Iran. Iran’s alliance 
with Syria along with Hezbollah and Hamas enhances its area of influence greatly.191 
Therefore, Syria turns out to be an ally of strategic importance for Iran. With increased 
influence in Iraq after the ousting of Saddam Hussein and its further expansion into Syria, 
Iran envisages its dominating role in the region. With the advent of rebellion in Syria and 
the impending fall of Assad’s government, however, Iran felt not only losing its strategic 
partner in the region but also its important base against Israel. Iran considers any movement 
to weaken the Syrian government as detrimental to Iranian interests. Thus, Iran’s alliance 
with Syria falls in the ambit of both identity as well as interest-based arguments. 
With the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran had learned how to find the entry way and 
successfully exploit the power vacuums for strategic gains. Iranians started their aggressive 
covert support to the Syrian government for suppressing the opposition. When and how 
Iran started intervening in Syria is not clear yet effort encompassing military, security, 
intelligence, and financial assistance can be seen since 2011.192  Iranian support to Assad’s 
regime has always been covert and denied by the Iranian government. The ensuing 
paragraphs will survey the ways and methods Iran used to support Assad’s regime in Syria. 
Iran, right from the outset of the uprising, alleged the involvement of external forces 
and termed this uprising as part of an international conspiracy to weaken the Syrian 
government (bastion of Iranian influence).193 Iranian former ambassador to Syria, Ahmed 
Mousavi stated, “Current events in Syria are designed by the foreign enemies and make 
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the second version of the sedition which took place in 2009 in Iran. The enemy is targeting 
the security and safety of Syria ... [The protestors] are foreign mercenaries, who get their 
message from the enemy and the Zionists.”194 Iran provided full support to Syria and 
legitimized its actions by saying the uprising was foreign sponsored. 
The Iranian support started covertly in the field of intelligence provision. Iran 
provided technical support in terms of monitoring mobile communication as well as the 
Internet. As per David W. Lesch, “There were credible reports that Iran was providing 
Syria with substantial assistance, particularly in surveillance technology to monitor email, 
mobile phones and the Internet, in order to combat the social media roots of the uprising 
and fight back against cyber warfare conducted by opposition groups.”195 This helped in 
identification of the groups involved in uprising and led to the subsequent operations. 
The extent to which the IRGC is involved can be comprehended from the fact that 
the effectiveness of the Syrian military had been degraded by the desertion of the Sunni 
commanders and recruits. The remaining forces were suffering from internal divisions and 
inexperience in urban warfare. Likewise, Shabiha gangs (Alawite groups in support of the 
Assad regime) were also ineffective against the unfavorable demographic reality (i.e., 
Sunni Arabs 60% and ruling Alawite 10%). The rebels had the clear advantage of getting 
support from the Sunni-dominant society. All these realities put the Assad regime in a 
fragile situation. Under these conditions, the IRGC spearheaded the establishment of 
paramilitary forces on the similar grounds under which the Basij was formed in Iran, 
because they were better suited for the urban kind of warfare.196 
Moreover, the IRGC and Quds Force were there on the ground in Syria for advising 
and training Assad’s military. Since 2012, Iran has been sending hundreds of IRGC and 
Basij fighters to Damascus.197 Reportedly, there are a few hundred commanders from Quds 
Force and other IRGC divisions in Syria along with thousands of Basij militiamen involved 
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in training and advising missions. In May 2012, Quds Force officer Esmail Qaani admitted 
that Iranian units were providing assistance to Syrian forces.198 The training included 
specializing in how to suppress the protests through use of force.199 Mohsen Chirazi was 
employed for his role as the head of the IRGC’s operation along with the additional task 
of imparting training to the Syrian forces. Likewise, Qassem Soleimani was exclusively 
employed in Syria for provision of material support to Syrian intelligence.200  
Between 2011 and 2012, the sphere of Iranian support reportedly increased and 
became more tangible in terms of material as well as financial support. This included 
transfer of weapons, material aid, and IRGC personnel to Syria. Iran had been transferring 
this support very covertly via different private airlines operating under the cover of 
humanitarian assistance provision to the Syrian people. Iran’s Mahan Air is reportedly 
involved in providing financial, material, and technological support along with 
transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to Quds Forces. Reportedly, 
117 aircraft have been used by Iran in transporting all kinds of support including weapons 
to Syria by air using different companies: Iran Air, Mahan Air, and Yas Air.201 Reportedly, 
Iranian planes delivered supplies to Syria on a daily basis in the period between 2012 and 
2013. Turkish authorities intercepted one cargo of weapons like AK-47s, assault rifles, 
machine guns, and ammunition in March 2011.202   
Likewise, the IRGC has also formed and trained forces that have been operating in 
parallel with the Syrian forces, against the rebels. Jaysh al Sha’abi (People’s Army) is one 
organization with a strength of 50,000–60,000 individuals. The IRGC has provided 
training, advice, weapons and equipment to the militia since 2012. The militia has been 
actively participating in Damascus and Aleppo both unilaterally and in combination with 
regime forces. The IRGC refers to them with different names including People’s Army, the 
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Popular Defense and Syrian Basij. Most of the recruits come from Alawite and Shi’i 
background.203 
Iran’s Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah have created the Alawite and  
Shi’i-dominated militia called National Defense Force (NDF).204 The NDF is the largest 
militia network in Syria, formed by amalgamation of local populace and other pro-Syrian 
government militant groups. The NDF employs local volunteer fighters and the IRGC 
supervises their training in urban and guerilla warfare. Moreover, Iran has organized, 
sponsored, and equipped a large number of Shi’i fighters for fighting against rebels and 
saving Assad’s regime. The fighters have been recruited from around the world on the 
sectarian (Shi’i versus Sunni) slogan. Iran is reportedly paying salaries to these groups 
fighting for Assad’s regime. One of the important groups includes Harakat Hezbollah al-
Nujaba; main pro-Syrian government militant organization in the battle of Aleppo and also 
suspected to have executed 82 civilians.205 The main motivation of the IRGC for 
establishing these militias was to keep Assad’s regime from collapsing.206 There have been 
reports of IRGC direct participation in limited operations.  
There have been reports of Iranians’ active participation in operations 
encompassing intelligence gathering and identifying enemy locations/targets. There have 
been Iranian casualties as well; the highest-ranking official killed was Hassan Shateri, a 
senior Quds Force officer who was symbolized as a martyr by Khamenei.207 This shows 
the level of Iranian involvement in Syria and its determination to maintain the Assad 
regime.  
Iran has also been rendering massive economic support to the Syrian forces. As per 
U.N. special envoy for Syria, “Iran has been spending between $6 million to $35 million 
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annually to support Assad’s regime.”208 Along with this, there have been increased 
economic ties between the two countries including a Free Trade Agreement in 2012 to 
enhance bilateral trade from $700 million to $2 billion. Moreover, Iran is using its own oil 
tankers for the carriage of Syria’s embargoed crude oil by hiding its origin and providing 
access to the market. Iran has also been reportedly assisting Syrian forces by fueling Syrian 
Army military vehicles either through direct shipment of oil or by providing credit lines to 
procure the fuel.209  
2. Saudi Involvement in the Syrian Crisis 
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are critical to the happenings in Syria and see their 
defeat as their opponent’s increased influence in the region, at the cost of their own reduced 
interests. Iran is providing all-out support to its ally, the Syrian government in the current 
civil war. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is backing Sunni rebels in their struggle against 
the oppressing rulers. Both countries are trying to gain influence in Syria, a society severely 
divided into sectarian, ethnic, and political lines.210 The sufferers are the Syrian people, as 
their country has become another arena for Saudi Arabia and Iran to fight against each 
other for accomplishing their geo-political aims. 
The relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria worsened intensely after the 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri, who was very close to the rulers of Saudi Arabia.211 The 
intensity of hostility kept on rising and both sides started engaging each other with 
accusations. Syrians alleged the Saudis supported anti-regime Salafis in Syria.212 In 2011, 
with the rise of unrest in Syria and the government’s brutal actions, the initial response of 
Saudi Arabia was careful, waiting for the Syrian government to address the issue through 
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dialogues and reforms.213 When the situation in Syria became more fragile for the ruling 
government, however, Saudi Arabia started envisaging it as an opportunity to reduce 
Iranian influence in the Middle East and enhance its own in Syria.214  
Saudi Arabia is providing physical as well as moral support to the suppressed Sunni 
faction of the country. Physical support is manifested in the form of vast financial support 
as well as provision of weapons to various rebel factions with the ultimate objective for 
regime change.215 Likewise, Saudi Arabia renders diplomatic support by raising its voice 
in the international forums against human rights violations by the Syrian government 
against the Sunni faction. Before analyzing the ways and methods by which Saudi Arabia 
is rendering support to various factions of Sunni rebels, I will explain the major rebel 
groups and promoting ideologies. 
 
Figure 2. Rebel Groups in Syria 
There is a multiplicity of rebel groups operating in Syria, categorized according to 
their promoting ideologies. The major constituents of rebels fighting against the Syrian 
government are Sunnis, who despite being in the majority do not enjoy the power in the 
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country.216 Rebel groups are divided into multiple factions owing to their differences, 
however, especially in the role of religion in an envisaged post-Assad scenario.217  As 
Afshon Ostovar and McCants explain, “We can distinguish four categories of Sunni Arab 
rebels based on their political goals and allegiances: Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood-aligned 
groups, amorphous Islamists and secularists.”218  
Salafis include groups like Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, who reject the democratic form 
of governance and promote the idea of an Islamic emirate through armed force, as well as 
the Syrian Islamic Front (SIL) advocating for establishing an Islamic state through the 
political process. Amorphous Islamist groups include the Faruq Brigade and Suqur al-
Sham under the umbrella of The Front to Liberate Syria (FLS). Members of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood are also called Ikhwanis. Some of the Brotherhood groups are part of 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA), but groups like Liwa’ al-Tawid do not consider them as part 
of FSA. Finally, the secularists include many groups fighting under the umbrella of FSA; 
they believe in a secular and democratic form of state.219 Owing to the complexities of the 
rebel groups, it is difficult to ascertain how and to whom Saudi Arabia was rendering 
assistance. 
There have been reports of Saudi Arabia’s assistance to multiple factions of rebel 
groups through multiple ways. Saudi Arabia has been a major supplier of military as well 
as financial assistance to the several rebel groups.220 Reportedly, since January 2012, Saudi 
Arabia has started funding rebel acquisition of weapons.221 Reportedly, Saudi Arabia 
started delivering weapons and funds through the Syrian National Council (SNC); SNC 
pledged to form an office to unite the rebels under SNC.222 SNC could not unite the rebel 
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groups, however, so FSA established its own political front for receiving funds and 
weapons. Saudi Arabia was the main source of funding for the FSA.223 Saudi Arabia has 
financed a large purchase of infantry weapons including recoilless rifles, antitank weapons, 
etc. Most of the weapons were delivered via the Turkish border in the north and the 
Jordanian border in the south.224 Saudi Prince Bandar Bin Sultan was appointed by Saudi 
Arabia to lead the efforts to topple Assad’s regime. Saudi Arabia has been reportedly 
sending prisoners sentenced to death to fight in Syria.225 
Saudi Arabian support was not confined to the FSA but was also extended to other 
groups. Reportedly, Saudi Arabia has also been sponsoring Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front in their 
fight against Assad’s regime. Nusra Front is a Salafist rebel group and is affiliated with Al-
Qaeda. Their support was in terms of provision of weapons as well as provision of finances. 
It has also been suspected that ISIS is getting support from Saudi Arabia. ISIS has 
reportedly been a main part of Bandar’s covert-operation strategy in Syria.226 The Saudi 
government has always denied this accusation. There have been signs that now Saudi 
Arabia has shifted its assistance from extremist groups in Syria to moderate opposition 
groups including the FSA. The reason for this shift is to help in managing the regional 
policies to deal with ISIS threat.227 As per Afshon Ostovar and Will McCant, 
Saudi Arabia has tried to clamp down on the private funding going to the 
most radical Islamist groups in Syria. When a group of Islamic scholars in 
Saudi Arabia set up a committee to collect private funds for the Syrian 
rebels, the Saudi Intelligence Security Agency asked them to stop and sign 
a pledge to that effect. They also announced their pledge over the Internet. 
Government has clamped down on clerics who are encouraging young 
Saudi men to go fight in Syria.228  
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Syrian ex-pats especially those residing in Saudi Arabia had been a major source 
of funds, especially during the initial period. As per Afshon Ostovar and Will McCants, 
“an estimated 400,000 to 1 million Syrians work in Saudi Arabia, half of whom live in 
Jeddah. Thirty members of SNC are Syrians living in Saudi Arabia, and an estimated 
90,000 more Syrians have fled the conflict to stay with family in kingdom. The Saudi 
government reportedly leaves them alone to send money to FSA. In July 2012, Syrian 
citizens, together with members of the Saudi royal family, raised between $30 million and 
$150 million for the support of the brothers in Syria.”229  
Saudi Arabia’s role in Syria is driven by the objective of reducing Iranian influence 
in Syria along with providing support to the suppressed Sunni populace of the country. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are entangled in the struggle to attain regional influence in the 
Middle East and invest to their best in the adjoining regions facing instability as well as 
power vacuum (i.e., Iraq and Syria). Post-Arab Spring events in Syria provided an 
opportunity to Riyadh to form a natural alliance with the efforts of Sunni factions of the 
country to replace Assad’s regime. It viewed this as a two-fold advantage i.e., replacement 
of Assad’s Alawite regime with a Sunni government with increased Saudi influence and 
decline in the Iranian influence in the country. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Saudi Arabia and Iran form the opposite poles in geo-politics of the Middle East. 
Their inter-state rivalry has affected the peace and stability of neighboring countries. The 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry is no longer a surreptitious affair and much scholarly work has been 
done on its genesis/reasons. Over a period of time, the relationship between the states has 
evolved into a competition with the objective of becoming regional power. The rivalry has 
evolved into more aggressive pursuits by both countries and has undergone a militant 
transformation. Both countries avoid direct clashes but openly support proxy wars in the 
adjoining countries. Iraq and Syria with already prevailing turmoil became victims of the 
rivalry politics between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
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Both countries are intent on to causing maximum damage to each other without 
realizing the impact of their course. As a result, it is the common man who is becoming 
prey to the proxy wars ignited by both countries for their ultimate objective of becoming 
the regional hegemon. As said by Karim Sadjadpur, “When the elephants fight, it is the 
grass which suffers. There have been millions of casualties in the Middle East including 
Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis. Iranian and Saudi citizens are not the ones who are suffering.”230 
Under the umbrella of religion and ideology, both countries have geo-political and 
economic motives with the ultimate objective of gaining regional influence. Since the arena 
is outside their countries, it is the populace of those other countries that suffer the most. 
Afshon Ostovar states regarding this turmoil and chaos, “As the rhetoric and proxy war 
escalates, neither side appreciates that they are destroying the region.”231 The behavior of 
both states has destructive consequences for the entire region. 
Although multiple factors shape the security dynamics of the Middle East, rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran stands more pronounced. The leadership of both countries 
is deeply engrossed in fueling the enmity instead of dialogues. The situation gets more 
perplexing as the leaders draw legitimacy for their existence (interpreted in their behavior) 
by using ideology that exhibits the inherent animosity between them. Under the complex 
environment, both countries aim for the geo-political and economic aim while denying the 
same to others. Iraq and Syria, due to power vacuum, have been on the influence agendas 
of both countries.  
The chaos in the Middle East can have devastating effects for the peace of 
the region. Syria and Iraq have become the breeding grounds for terrorism and 
massive weaponization, problems that are funded mainly by Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Multiple organizations have been formed with allegiance toward either Iran or Saudi 
Arabia. The ratio of civilian/non-combatant casualties is extremely high. Although, in 
Syria, there have been many other factors including Russian involvement, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran remain the major reason for the disturbance and chaos in the country. The policy 
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of undermining each other to attain regional influence has tarnished the entire region and 
threatens to engulf it in greater suffering.  
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 The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has a devastating impact on the security dynamics of the 
Middle East. Both countries have evolved into stubborn rivals and this evolving dimension 
of the rivalry can be detrimental to the peace of an already chaotic region. Understanding 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry in its totality can help in better policy formulation and refined efforts 
leading to the peace of the region. This thesis focused on identifying the compatible 
theoretical explanations of Saudi-Iranian rivalry and deliberated upon the methods and 
behavior of both countries to undermine each other. While concluding, the ensuing 
paragraphs will delineate the summary of thesis research and hypotheses evaluation as well 
as elaborating where this rivalry is leading.  
A. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis analyzed the grass roots of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, its genesis, and the 
way it is shaping up and embroiling the adjoining countries in its mayhem. Apparently, an 
ideologically driven enmity has geo-political and economic aims. Apart from direct 
rhetorical confrontation, however, both countries have avoided direct clashes and used the 
arenas other than their own territories. The Middle East, especially Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, 
has been a region of uncertainty for over four decades. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
using the existing turmoil as a mean to spread their influence. Both countries are at daggers 
drawn to spread their influence in the region. This is causing sheer violence and massive 
innocent killings. 
In the first part, this thesis explains the theoretical reason of rivalry through the lens 
of IR. The thesis deduces that the rivalry looks like realist-manifested competition driven 
by the motive of gaining power. It has other contributory factors explainable through the 
constructivist lens, however. Realist explanations cover the quest for geo-political 
influence and fearing others’ increasing influence as existential threats for oneself. 
Constructivists have an explanation for other important factors, however, namely 
ideological differences, incongruence dilemma, and parochial interests of power brokers 
i.e., the presence of strong religious clergy in both countries. 
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Subsequently, this thesis examines three case studies: Iran Iraq War (1980–88), 
turbulent Iraq since 2003 and war-shaken Syria after the Arab Spring. This analysis 
identifies the role both countries play to enhance their own influence, undermine the other 
and ultimately destroy the peace of the region. After examining these case studies, my 
thesis deduces Iran (except in Iran-Iraq War) as the initiator in the efforts of enhancing its 
geo-political influence and Saudi Arabia as the reactor. Although both countries toil to 
attain influence in the region, Iran has mostly been the initiator especially in the prevalent 
era. 
While surveying the Iran-Iraq war, the thesis explored that Saudi involvement was 
in reaction to the envisaged threat of Iran capturing Iraq. Saudi Arabia envisaged the war 
as a threat because Iranian victory would mean its complete dominance in the region. At 
the same time, Saudi Arabia viewed it as an opportunity to reduce the newly emerging 
threat from Khomeini’s Iran. The thesis explores various prongs of support Saudi Arabia 
rendered in its motive of undermining the then newly emerged rival. The non-conclusive 
end of the war yielded the transformation of the newly emerged enmity into the lasting 
rivalry in the following decades.   
The other case studies were related to the relatively prevailing era, which explored 
how both countries are exploiting the instability of Iraq and Syria to exert their influence. 
The thesis again infers that Iran has been the initiator in its quest of enhancing geo-political 
influence as it exploited the power vacuum in Iraq after Saddam Hussein. Iran not only 
enhanced its political influence in these countries but also supported armed militancy by 
arming various groups. Saudi Arabia’s role was again a reactionary one and tried to deny 
Iranian influence by strengthening Sunnis in Iraq. In this quest for power, both countries 
are sponsoring militancy in the region and destroying the region’s peace. 
This thesis will proffer findings based on the hypotheses given in Chapter 1 and 
will conclude with where this rivalry is leading. 
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B. HYPOTHESES EVALUATION  
1. H1 – Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Is Driven by Religion 
My thesis attempted to investigate hypothesis 1: Saudi-Iranian rivalry is primarily 
driven by religious disputes and sectarian agendas by both states. The behavior as well as 
policies of both countries are primarily motivated by a desire to spread their brand of Islam 
beyond their borders. Since most people grade this rivalry as a religiously-driven rivalry, 
it was very important to understand the correct role and involvement of religion in 
stimulating the relations in the case of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Is it the main driver as it 
appears or one of the contributory factors?  
The findings of the thesis do not support this hypothesis that religion drives the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the motive of both countries is to promote their brand of Islam. 
It does not completely negate the involvement of religion in shaping the rivalry, however. 
Since religious clergy have a strong hold in the policy making of internal as well as external 
politics, they effectively use religion to legitimize their rivalry and motivate the masses. 
Moreover, the parochial interests of both countries’ religious clout is in keeping the rivalry 
on, keep creating provocative narratives and publicizing others’ actions as efforts to spread 
their brand of Islam.     
While religion has been a significant contributory factor, it is not the main driver 
of the rivalry. Both countries have enjoyed cordial relations with regional cooperation 
engagements, especially in the past. The Iranian Revolution and Khomeini’s associated 
ambition to export the ideology was the initial root cause of rivalry. Nonetheless, it can be 
concluded that both countries are effectively using religion as a political tool to provide a 
face to their hidden ambitions. 
2. H2 – Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Is Driven by Geo-Political Motives 
While exploring hypothesis 2 of my thesis, it deduced that while both countries 
have tremendous drive for increasing their influence, Iran initiates the efforts in its 
aspirations for enhanced regional influence. Iran’s geo-political policy is based on 
enhancing its influence in the region by using ideology as a tool. The thesis also explored 
that while Iran mostly initiates the efforts of attaining geo-political gains, Saudi Arabia is 
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in a reactionary mode and both countries get embroiled in rivalry.  The three case studies 
show how both countries are involved in a struggle for gaining regional influence by using 
the turf of other countries. In doing so, both countries are sponsoring militancy and 
perpetuating violence in the region. Iraq and Syria have been war trodden with most of 
their urban area turned into rubble and massive innocent killings. Although there have been 
multiple factors in the prevalent mayhem in these countries, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry forms 
one of the major constituents. The reason for both countries’ investment in the prevailing 
turmoil is to gain enhanced regional influence.  
The findings of my thesis support the hypothesis that the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is 
driven by the quest and desire of both countries to achieve geo-political motives of 
enhanced influence in the region while undermining the other. There has been sufficient 
evidences that both countries are aggressively raising their client militant groups and 
providing all-out support to them. As a result, there is an unending upsurge in the violence 
and militancy in the region. Neither country, however, is ready to give up. 
3. H3 – Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Is Due to Perception-Building of Each 
Other As Rivals 
During my research, the thesis explored hypothesis 3 that in the process of state 
formation and the rise of nationalism, leaders of both countries have built the perception 
regarding the other country as rival. While this is true and forms one of the constituents of 
the rivalry, we cannot grade this as the sole reason for the rivalry. During my research, my 
thesis explored the concept that the presence of strong religious power and its influence on 
the politics of both countries makes both countries perceive each other as potential threats. 
Strong and influential religious clergy impart the perception that the others intend to spread 
their ideology. Moreover, the leaders of both countries also generate these perceptions for 
state building or imparting nationalism. The hostile perceptions of both countries regarding 
each other keep embroiling them in antagonizing relations. The hostile perceptions do not 
form the single most important reason for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, but they are 
contributory factors.  
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C. WHERE THIS RIVALRY IS LEADING 
Different regional issues having varying degrees of impact in shaping the future 
geo-political environments of the Middle East. Ones that are more significant include the 
enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the eruption of civil wars in countries like Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry, however, forms the most critical dispute, 
producing pronounced effects in the prevailing mayhem of the region as well as in shaping 
the future geo-political dynamics of the Middle East. The distinctive character of this 
rivalry is that both countries are contesting in the arena of a third country, thus, not only 
avoiding direct confrontation but also remaining immune to the wrath of their sponsored 
militancy. 
The flavor of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry can be traced as one of the contributing 
factors in every prevailing crisis of the Middle East including Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. The 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry did not form the initial spark of the anarchy in these countries. It 
definitely has added petroleum to the already lit fire, however, by sponsoring militancy 
through relentless political, financial, and armed support, thus exploding the conflicts. To 
increase their influence, both countries have extensively supported client militancy in other 
countries by raising, funding, arming, training, and at times fighting with the sponsored 
militants. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are fire-branding the religious legitimacy for their 
own heinous ends. This has furthered the societal divide in the Middle East by reducing 
the various groups’ acceptance of each other. The unfortunate citizens of selected arena 
countries are the ultimate victims.  
In the proxy wars between various militant factions (clients to either Saudi Arabia 
or Iran), it is the innocent civilians who are becoming prey to the havocs of militancy. The 
killings are enormous in number and the wrath of destruction into rubble is massive. The 
rivalry between the two giants of the Middle East has divided the entire region on a political 
as well as religious basis. Both countries are generating and spreading hatred and anguish. 
The prevailing chaos in the region has the potential to engulf the entire region into its wrath. 
In order to understand the geo-politics of the Middle East in the prevailing mayhem, 
it is imperative to understand Saudi-Iranian rivalry deliberately. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry 
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has more grave consequences for the peace of the region than any other issue in the Middle 
East including the Palestine-Israel issue. The thesis findings show that although both 
countries are not actually fighting with each other yet they are involved in a horrendous 
quest for aspiring enhanced regional influence by vigorously sponsoring militancy. 
Policymakers in the world should deliberate on this sensitive and ever-increasing rivalry 
to formulate the policies in mediating the tension between the two giants of the Middle 
East. Likewise, regional organizations and international organizations should play more 
assertive role in directing both countries to stop spreading militancy. The Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry, if not checked, has the potential to destroy the regional peace and offers other 
dreadful global implications.   
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